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Summary: The total debt of Hungarian local governments accumulated during the 2002–2008 period was consolidated in full by the 
government between 2011 and 2014. Most of the debt assumed by the central budget was denominated in foreign currency, which 
involved high exchange risk and, therefore, financial instability for both the central and the local subsystems of public finances. 
According to some economists, the bailout of local governments by the state is another manifestation of the soft budget limit, showing 
that the Hungarian market economy is unable to break with the bad culture of centrally planned economy. The present study – buil-
ding on primary research – presents the process that led to the indebtedness of local governments, as well as the theoretical and 
practical background of consolidation. The author believes it is unwarranted to enforce a hard budget limit for the local governments 
at any price. 
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SSySTeMic inTroducTionThe new Hungarian state reorganised from 2010 carried out successful financial consoli-dation by 2013. Large international corpora-
tions and banks were made to contribute more 
to public dues, while the corporate income tax 
for mostly Hungarian-owned companies with 
lower revenues, and the personal income tax 
for wage earners in households were reduced1 
and a wide range of social measures2 were in-
troduced. The expansion of solvent demand re-
sulted in an increase in domestic consumption 
as well as the willingness to invest. As a result 
of comprehensive fiscal measures, Hungary was 
removed from the countries that were under 
the excessive deficit procedure of the European 
Union. Instead of an automatic, normative en-
forcement of the European Union’s principles 
of monetary policy, in March 2013 Hungary 
began to reshape the tools of the National Bank 
of Hungary in order to ensure economic expan-
sion and macro-economic stabilisation. The au-
dits of the State Audit Office of Hungary have 
contributed to defining the directions of fiscal 
consolidation and the assessment of loans taken 
out for bailout.3 In the period after the summer 
of 2010, the first round of measures focused on 
the mitigation of payment costs in the central 
budget and then in the social security system.
National bankruptcy in Hungary in the 
period of 2008–2013, which would have re-
sulted in a total failure in the operation of the 
national economy, can be typified in five ways 
and in terms of five categories on the basis of 
a systemic approach:4
•	the central budget becomes inoperable, 
the operation of the state becomes impos-
sible, state public services and debt service 
fail,
•	the social security and especially the pen-
sion system accumulates a chronic deficit,5 E-mail address: Lentner.Csaba@uni-nke.hu
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the payment of pension allowances stalls 
and eventually fails,
•	en masse bankruptcy of banks and compa-
nies, operative environment becoming un-
stable, state and household savings stuck, 
basic production functions eliminated, 
unemployment becoming unmanageable,
•	en masse bankruptcy of local governments 
in the local system of public finances, so-
cial conflicts and problems in local public 
services generated,
•	families with foreign currency loans be-
coming insolvent and facing eviction on 
a social scale.6
In order to maintain the operation of market 
players, the Hungarian government assumed 
an active role to influence economic policy. 
The ruling idea of the neoliberal market econ-
omy model – which holds that market players 
are capable of self-regulation, sectoral regula-
tion and creating a balance – was replaced by 
the state playing an active part in the regula-
tion of the economy. It regulates and super-
vises the operation of market players. It breaks 
with the basic philosophy of the Washington 
Consensus.7 It creates sales markets for busi-
nesses, declares the economic policy of open-
ing to the East, while it continues to view the 
European Union as its major ally and partner. 
It seeks to finance the operation of the state 
by optimising the tax system, in other words, 
creating extra tax revenues through reorganis-
ing the public dues system. Instead of using 
the loans granted by international financial 
institutions (IMF, World Bank) and observing 
the economic advice attached to them, it seeks 
to solve the financing of the central budget by 
using internal resources8 and the inclusion 
of new “eastern” partners. After comprehen-
sive fiscal and monetary reforms, the second 
quarter of 20139 saw the beginning of marked 
and continuous economic expansion in Hun-
gary.10 The state consolidation of local govern-
ments that took place between 2011 and the 
spring of 2014 was extended to another seg-
ment of public finances.
econoMic ProceSSeS AT locAl 
governMenTS AfTer THe PoliTicAl 
TrAnSforMATion
The act on local governments11 used the provi-
sions of the former Constitution to define the 
operative rules for local governments, which 
replaced the Soviet-type council system of the 
socialist centrally planned economic system. 
The local governments with broad responsi-
bilities were given a high degree of autonomy 
in terms of financial management as well as in 
the area of restructuring.
The National Assembly continued to en-
act laws in order to strengthen the economic 
foundations of the local government system, 
which provided more leeway for local govern-
ments and which were required to create an 
environment for effective operation and eco-
nomic independence. In addition to the act 
on local taxes, the State Property Act apply-
ing to local governments, which was enacted 
in 1991 by the National Assembly, played a 
crucial role in providing economic independ-
ence for local governments. The Local Gov-
ernment Act provided that the ownership of 
– among others – public utility companies 
owned by councils, the education, healthcare, 
cultural and other institutions run by the lo-
cal councils, state tenement flats, all financial 
assets, all securities and other economic rights 
of the councils should be transferred to the lo-
cal authorities. Some of the assets were trans-
ferred to local governments pursuant to the 
Act on Local Governments, while others were 
transferred by the property transfer commit-
tees set up for this purpose. It was at this time 
that legal background and the organisational 
framework for targeted and earmarked subsi-
dies were created.
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However, the local government system that 
began to develop in the 1990s saw a signifi-
cant decentralisation of tasks from the state 
and the central budget, but the deployment 
of tasks was not followed by the decentralisa-
tion of central resources, so by the turn of the 
millennium, there was a significant operating 
deficit in the local public finance subsystem. 
It became quite common for the local gov-
ernments to use development resources, espe-
cially investment loans, secretly, for operating 
expenditure.12 The decentralisation of tasks 
that began in the middle of the 1990s resulted 
in the decentralisation of deficit within public 
finances and soon afterwards the total debt of 
public finances also got into a decentralisation 
vacuum.
After becoming a full-fledged member of 
the European Union in 2004, new develop-
ment subsidies became available for local gov-
ernments. They were able to use significant EU 
and domestic grants provided for development 
purposes for investments, renovation and the 
procurement of equipment implemented in 
order to create, maintain and develop the in-
frastructure required to carry out their tasks. 
With the emergence of European resources, 
the subsidy system of domestic development 
projects has changed. Point 1 of Chapter 2 of 
National Assembly Resolution No. 67/2007 
(VI. 28.) on regional development support 
and the principles of decentralisation defines 
the need for the concentration of purely do-
mestic resources not meant for co-financing to 
ensure that they are used efficiently. However, 
the budget acts did not provide or allow for 
sufficient resources to fund the development 
tasks of local governments, especially for the 
own contributions required for EU develop-
ment grants. Between 2006 and 2010, HUF 
388 billion in central budgetary appropriation 
were made available for development grants for 
local governments. HUF 185 billion in target-
ed and earmarked subsidies, HUF 55 billion 
in centralised appropriations, HUF 31 billion 
in chapter-managed appropriations and HUF 
117 billion in decentralised regional develop-
ment appropriations. The largely infrastruc-
tural development sources made available 
after the EU accession boosted investment at 
local governments. As, however, they did not 
have sufficient funds for their own contribu-
tion to the development grants, they took out 
loans and issued foreign exchange bonds to 
ensure this contribution – taking advantage of 
the opportunity provided by the government. 
As a result, the indebtedness of the local gov-
ernment subsystem of public finances, along 
with the decentralisation of its debt portfolio, 
began to increase further. On top of all this, 
the loans taken out, along with the EU grants, 
were mostly spent on infrastructural rather 
than productive investments. Therefore, there 
was no direct return, hence no coverage for 
the credit service generated from profits. Lo-
cal governments did not have sufficient for-
eign currency revenues for repayment either. 
With the 2008 crisis, the financial instability 
of the local government subsystem – due to 
the higher exchange rate risk – affected the 
whole of public finances.
THe figHT AgAinST locAl governMenT 
debT in THe work of THe STATe AudiT 
office of HungAry
After 2010, the debt issue, which damaged the 
fundamentals of the state’s operation, was at 
the centre of Hungarian financial policy. Al-
though the total debt of the local governments 
was insignificant compared to the amount of 
debt accumulated by the central government, 
by 2011 the audits of the State Audit Office 
of Hungary (SAO)13 proved that the local 
subsystem was extremely fragile in a financial 
sense.14 Under previous governments, there 
was no coverage for the repayment of local 
 FOCUS – Transforming Local Governments 
Public Finance Quarterly  2014/3 313
government credits and debenture loans. The 
State Audit Office of Hungary focused most 
of its audit capacities on local governments in 
2011. Act CLXXXIX of 2011 on Local Gov-
ernments relies on the findings of the SAO. 
These findings were incorporated into legisla-
tion, whereby the supreme audit institution 
contributed to good governance and the es-
tablishment of an efficient state.
The SAO reports clearly showed that the 
financial equilibrium of Hungarian local 
governments deteriorated between 2007 and 
2010, and financial risks increased over the 
same period.15 The audit institution pointed 
out the reasons that lead to this situation. The 
lack of operating and accumulation funds 
emerged simultaneously in the local govern-
ment system. The exposure of local govern-
ments to banks increased, forcing them to 
renew and extend the amount set out in their 
liquidity loan contracts. The debt issue was 
truly serious challenge to meet because most 
of the local governments failed to create the 
reserves required to repay the liabilities to fi-
nancial institutions. The funds serving as cov-
erage for repayment were not identified. It was 
also risky that some of the property items that 
belonged to the nominal assets of local govern-
ments were also offered as security for loans. 
The SAO also warned that in the case of the 
issued bonds, beyond the unfavourable devel-
opments of the exchange rate, pre-term recon-
version or conversion into Hungarian forints 
could also cause unexpected expenses. The 
increase in trade payables represented further 
risk. The provision of funds required by the 
subsequent financing of projects implemented 
with the help of EU grants also caused liquid-
ity problems. By the end of 2010, the local 
governments accumulated HUF 1154 billion 
in future commitments due to their invest-
ment projects in progress. In addition to the 
EU grants, domestic government grants and 
their own revenue, town local governments 
operating in the medium range needed an ad-
ditional HUF 217 billion in external funding. 
Giving up on investments was not an option 
either, as the infrastructure of local govern-
ments was outdated and, on the other hand, it 
was the investments implemented at the me-
dium level that gave momentum to the coun-
try’s performance, which was already in crisis 
struggling with falling GDP.16 Thirdly, due to 
the shortage of central budgetary funds, 90 
per cent of new facilities in Hungary are built 
using EU funds.
On top of all this, the business associations 
under the majority ownership of local gov-
ernments also accumulated significant debts. 
Local governments failed to pay sufficient at-
tention to control the indebtedness of their 
business associations. In 2011, the only possi-
bility to resolve the debt issue was for the gov-
ernment to assume these debts, which process 
began at the end of 2011 by the assumption 
of county local government debts. Prime Min-
ister Viktor Orbán announced on 27 October 
2012 that the government would assume the 
entire debt portfolio of towns with a popula-
tion of less than five thousand and some of the 
debt of the towns larger than that.17 In 2014, 
the government assumed the remaining debt 
of the towns with more than five thousand in-
habitants as well. The auditing work and the 
proposals of the State Audit Office18 provided a 
good basis for the implementation of the debt 
consolidation at local governments. The local 
governments that had not taken out loans in 
the so-called general period of indebtedness to 
increase their wealth received a total of HUF 
12,1 billion in compensatory development 
grants in 2014.19 Therefore, the “economising” 
(often uncreditworthy) local governments that 
managed their finances without loans typically 
did not generate “losses.”20
The question often arises why the consoli-
dation of debts took place in the middle of 
the government term and especially why it 
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was necessary. The financial situation of local 
governments was disastrous. They were unable 
to resolve the situation on their own. The en 
masse bankruptcy of local governments would 
have resulted in the negligence of their pub-
lic tasks. A wave of discontent, social conflicts 
and eventually national bankruptcy would 
have set in. With the turn in fiscal trend, the 
government managed to consolidate the cen-
tral budget by the middle of its term. There 
was an opportunity (growing financial buffer 
and leeway) for assuming the debts of local 
governments. On the other hand, it made po-
litical sense to propose it before 2014, when 
the circumstances were “ripe” for it. If this 
consolidation had begun towards the end of 
the term, Brussels might have put obstacles in 
its way. However, without shedding light on 
the problems – for which the credit goes to 
the SAO – the consolidation of the local gov-
ernments could hardly have taken place (with-
out conflicts). By implementing this, the gov-
ernment managed to avoid another national 
bankruptcy.
PreSSure for conSolidATion
The debt of local governments does not just 
affect the people living at the given settlement. 
It is in the interest of the national economy to 
avoid recreating indebtedness since the fight 
against debt is at the centre of the Hungar-
ian financial policy. The financial equilibrium 
of the local governments deteriorated consid-
erably in the past decade, especially between 
2007 and 2010, and financial risks increased 
significantly. The lack of operating and accu-
mulation funds emerged simultaneously in 
the local government system. The exposure of 
local governments to banks increased and it 
became common practice to renew these liq-
uid loan agreements annually, mostly out of 
necessity and in increasing loan amounts. It 
should also be noted that the HUF 388 bil-
lion in purely domestic development grants 
used in the 2006–2010 period was rather dis-
proportionate. This amount was HUF 121 
billion in 2006, HUF 107 billion in 2007, 
HUF 103 billion in 2008, HUF 47 billion in 
2009 and only HUF 10 billion in 2010. This 
trend shows that the local government sector 
was under-financed from the outset.
The liabilities of local governments against 
financial institutions increased by a total of 
77.7 per cent by 2010 compared to 2007, al-
though the increase was varied for the various 
types of local governments. The liabilities of 
the subsystem of local governments resulting 
from bond issuance showed a nearly 25-fold 
increase. Compared to the opening total value 
in 2007, there was an increase of HUF 564 
billion, amounting to a total value of HUF 
588 billion in 2010. The increase in liabili-
ties due to borrowing was of a more moderate 
pace; compared to the opening total liabilities 
in 2007, there was an increase of HUF 192 
billion (41 per cent) in 2010. 75 per cent of 
the total increase in debts (HUF 756 billion) 
– realised primarily in 2007–2008 – was due 
to bond issuance.
84,6 per cent of the total debt of HUF 
1247 billion, recorded by the local govern-
ment subsystem at the end of 2010, was gen-
erated by those local governments – Budapest, 
the counties and the towns with county rank 
– which were rated by the State Audit Office 
as highly risky and therefore subject to a com-
prehensive audit21 in 2011–2012.
One of the main reasons for indebtedness 
was that local governments did not have funds 
for their own contribution to EU supported 
investments. Therefore, long-term resources 
had to be found which could help local gov-
ernments apply for EU grants. They raised 
these funds by issuing foreign currency-de-
nominated bonds. The debt issue was a truly 
serious challenge to meet because most of the 
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local governments failed to create the reserves 
required to repay the liabilities to financial in-
stitutions. The funds serving as coverage for 
repayment were typically not identified. It was 
also risky that each of the property items that 
belonged to the nominal assets of the local gov-
ernments were also offered as collateral for the 
loans. In the case of bonds issued, beyond the 
unfavourable developments of the exchange 
rate, pre-term reconversion or conversion into 
Hungarian forints could also cause unexpected 
expenses. However, the main risk factor was 
exposure to the exchange rate since there was 
no running coverage for the liabilities due in 
foreign currency. Local governments did not 
have revenues in a foreign currency which they 
could use to safely repay the principal and the 
interest of foreign currency loans free from the 
volatility of exchange rates. The investments 
implemented from EU grants and foreign cur-
rency loans are typically non-productive, so it 
was not possible to use the returns to generate 
the required funds.
In addition to the subsequent financing 
of projects from EU grants, the increase in 
trade payables and their high level against the 
monthly average of non-personnel expenses 
also created additional risk. Due to the lim-
ited availability of funds, local governments 
typically considered suppliers instruments of 
external financing. Between 2007 and 2010, 
the trade payables portfolio of the local gov-
ernment sector grew from HUF 85 billion 
to HUF 105 billion, with overdue debts in-
creasing from HUF 26 billion to HUF 44 bil-
lion (by 69.2 per cent). In the same period, 
monthly non-personnel expenses rose from 
HUF 44 to HUF 53 billion.
The business associations under the major-
ity ownership of local governments also ac-
cumulated significant debts, and at the same 
time, for lack of legislative authorisation, be-
fore 2011 the State Audit Office of Hungary 
did not have the right to audit these compa-
nies owned by local governments, Which in 
turn failed to pay sufficient attention to pre-
vent their business associations from becom-
ing indebted. In many cases, they also failed to 
present their own financial risks together with 
that of their business associations. Liability as 
owners—if certain conditions are met—for 
the debts of business associations constitutes 
both financial and consolidation risk, such as 
in the case of the Budapest Transport Compa-
ny (BTC). In 2011, at the initiative of the new 
SAO management but before the new SAO 
Act was enacted, the mandate of the supreme 
state audit authority was extended to business 
associations owned by local governments, and 
the first company to come under the micro-
scope of the auditors was the BTC.
Assessing the financial management and 
audit processes of local governments up to 
2010, it is important to stress that the central 
regulation regarding the limitation and ration-
alisation of debts was also unable to fulfil its 
function. Since the local governments took, 
that is, were entitled to take liabilities that 
exceeded their financial capacity, central debt 
management was inevitable because a large 
number of local governments going bankrupt 
would have caused unpredictable problems in 
public finances.
THe ProceSS of debT conSolidATion 
AT locAl governMenTS
The government consolidated the debts of 
local governments in three stages. The first 
round of debt consolidation involved settle-
ments and towns with less than 5000 inhab-
itants. The state assumed a total of HUF 74 
billion in debts owed by 1710 settlements and 
towns stemming from 3848 contracts. In ac-
cordance with the applicable procedure, the 
local governments paid HUF 3.5 billion in 
security deposit to the treasury.
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In the course of the consolidation of debts 
owed by settlements and towns with less than 
5000 inhabitants
•	the HUF-denominated debts of 1684 lo-
cal governments in the amount of HUF 
50.5 billion were consolidated and HUF 
73 million was paid to the Treasury as se-
curity deposit which came from the termi-
nation of loan agreements,
•	the debts owed by local governments in 
Swiss franc (foreign currency loans in the 
amount of CHF 94 million owed by 97 
local governments on the basis of 103 loan 
agreements) were also settled,
•	13 of the local governments included in 
the consolidation process had EUR-de-
nominated debts in the amount of 2.9 bil-
lion euros (on the basis of 16 agreements). 
In this case, the government also decided 
on debt settlement and concurrently or-
dered the affected organisations to pay 
HUF 50.5 million and EUR 50.000 as se-
curity deposit to the account of the Gov-
ernment Debt Management Agency.
Pursuant to statutory provisions, a sepa-
rate government resolution stipulated that 
the debt consolidation of 14 towns must be 
realised by 28 June 2013 in accordance with 
the 2013 Act on the Budget. The reason for 
this was that some of these local governments 
were either under debt settlement proceedings 
or they only had interest for default stemming 
from previous loans or their agreements could 
not come under the scope of consolidation 
(e.g. a financial lease agreement), and there 
were seven local governments which did not 
want to take advantage of consolidation.
The exchange rate used in the procedure 
was HUF 238.6 for Swiss franc and HUF 
288.3 for euro-denominated loans. The con-
solidation of the debts was entered into the 
accounts on the basis of portfolio data record-
ed on 11 December 2012, followed by finan-
cial settlement on 28 December 2012.
In the second stage of debt consolidation, 
pursuant to Article 72(1) of Act CCIV of 2012 
on the 2013 Central Budget of Hungary, the 
Hungarian State partially assumed the debt 
portfolio, and the contributions associated with 
it up to the date of assumption as at 31 De-
cember 2012, of local governments with popu-
lations over 5000 – including the Municipality 
of Budapest, the district local governments. The 
debts affected by partial assumption included 
outstanding debts due – on loans or credits, se-
curities constituting a debt instrument as well 
as the issuance of bills of exchange in the case 
of assumed debts – to a financial institution in 
accordance with Act CXCIV of 2011 on Hun-
gary’s Economic Stability and the act on credit 
institutions and financial enterprises. The Hun-
garian State assumed the full amount of debts 
and related contributions payable by local gov-
ernments with over 5000 inhabitants as defined 
in Article 72(2) of the Act, in other words, the 
loans taken out in connection with inpatient 
institutions and certain specialised social and 
child protection institutions which had already 
been transferred over to the state for operation. 
A further condition for consolidation was that 
the given local government should not have 
any debt settlement procedure in progress as at 
31 December 2012, pursuant to the act on the 
debt settlement procedure.
The details of consolidation for towns with 
over 5000 inhabitants were set out in Arti-
cles 72–75 of Act CCIV of 2012 on the 2013 
Central Budget. Pursuant to the Act on the 
Budget, the assumption did not apply to the 
pre-financing of grants paid from the central 
subsystem of public finances, grants directly 
awarded by the EU or provided by interna-
tional organisations, payment obligations 
stemming from the advance payment of VAT 
and other revenues constituting a debt, and 
payment obligations deriving from loans as-
sumed from a water utility association by a lo-
cal government affected by a grant. Pursuant 
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to the Act on the Budget, the local govern-
ment had to pay to the state the amount of 
deposit or outstanding balance used as cover-
age or security expressly for the debt item af-
fected by the assumption, in proportion to the 
amount of debt item assumed and at most in 
the amount of this debt item.
The Act on the Budget referred to before 
also defined the set of conditions that govern 
the benchmark amount of the assumption. 
One of the frequently used methods in the 
local government financing system is the cal-
culation of tax capacity, which is based on the 
“revenue-generating” potential of local gov-
ernments in accordance with pre-defined cri-
teria. The calculation performed by the Min-
istry for National Economy is based on the 
local business tax base recorded and declared 
in the 2012 semi-annual financial statements 
of local governments. 1.4 per cent of this was 
used to determine the average realisable rev-
enue from local business tax (calculating with 
70 per cent of the maximum 2 per cent lo-
cal business tax rate) for every town, divided 
by the number of inhabitants as at 1 January 
2012, which gives the tax capacity per capita.
After these calculations had been carried 
out, the towns were classified into various cat-
egories. The Act on the Budget defined four 
town and settlement categories. Then the per 
capita tax capacity data of the towns within 
each category were sorted in terms of size, 
and the data of the top 10 and bottom 10 per 
cent were filtered out. Using the remaining 80 
per cent of the data, a simple arithmetic aver-
age was calculated to determine the adjusted 
average of each town category. Next, on the 
basis of the amount of debt assumption for 
each town, the per capita tax capacity of the 
given town was calculated with respect to the 
adjusted average of its town category.
If the tax capacity of a local government af-
fected by assumption with respect to the ad-
justed average of its town category:
•	was equal to or over 100 per cent, 40 per 
cent of its debt,
•	was between 75 per cent and 100 per cent, 
50 per cent of its debt,
•	was between 50 per cent and 75 per cent, 
60 per cent of its debt,
•	was below 50 per cent, 70 per cent of its 
debt was used as the basis for debt as-
sumption by the state.
Calculated in Hungarian forint, the tax ca-
pacity category averages were as follows:
•	towns with county rank, HUF 35,997,
•	other towns with over 10 thousand inhab-
itants, HUF 23,550,
•	other towns with between 5 and 10 thou-
sand inhabitants, HUF 16,049,
•	settlements with less than 5 thousand in-
habitants, HUF 13,278.
The Minister of National Economy and the 
Minister of the Interior had the right to de-
termine an assumption ratio higher than the 
ratio set out in the Act on the Budget (40–70 
per cent).
In accordance with the Act on the Budg-
et, local governments and financial institu-
tions had to supply data for the debt items 
outstanding as at 31 December 2012 and af-
fected by consolidation until 11 January 2013 
via the Treasury’s electronic system. 278 local 
governments supplied data for a total of 2015 
agreements in the amount of HUF 1033 bil-
lion in debts (calculated at the exchange rate 
valid as at 31 December 2012), which formed 
the basis of partial debt consolidation.
Broken down by currency:
•	HUF 334.5 billion in HUF-denominated 
debts as at 31 December related to 1527 
agreements,
•	CHF 1.8 billion in CHF-denominated 
debts (HUF 422.1 billion) related to 370 
agreements,
•	EUR 949.4 million in EUR-denominated 
debts (HUF 276.5 billion) related to 118 
agreements.
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The debt items that were included in the 
consolidation stemmed from overdraft facili-
ties, wage loans, short-term loan agreements, 
long-term loans (HUF 476.9 billion), bond 
issuance (HUF 472.8 billion) and bills of ex-
change. A total of HUF 477.1 billion in debt 
was assumed of the debt indicated (on the ba-
sis of assumption levels defined by the Act on 
the Budget).
The data supplied by the local governments 
indicated HUF 9.1 billion in loans taken out 
for the operation and development of inpa-
tient institutions and certain specialised social 
and child protection institutions, which were 
assumed in full.
The local governments had to pay HUF 6.8 
billion in security to the central budget for the 
debt items affected by consolidation (on the 
basis of the assumption levels defined by law). 
As the conclusion of the first stage of consoli-
dation – in compliance with applicable regu-
lations –, the affected local governments and 
the state concluded an agreement by 28 Feb-
ruary 2013 on the assumption levels, which 
was followed by a trilateral agreement made 
by 28 June between the Government Debt 
Management Agency, the financial institu-
tions and the town concerned.
During the consultations between the par-
ties, 90 per cent, a total of 250 affected local 
governments said they would need higher as-
sumption values for the following reasons:
•	local business tax revenues have signifi-
cantly decreased since the data were sup-
plied,
•	the given local government does not see 
any opportunity for expanding the range 
of taxes and generating more tax revenues,
•	comments on the 2013 budgetary condi-
tions (difficulties in planning the budget 
without operating deficit, schools have to 
be operated fully from own money with-
out budgetary funds, local government 
tasks continue to require additional funds 
provided by the local government, the 
compensation is low, and the leeway of 
local governments with local business tax 
revenues becomes restricted),
•	the business associations of local govern-
ments have significant debts; in many 
cases they undertook an absolute guaran-
tee which is – naturally – not part of the 
consolidation,
•	a lump-sum repayment obligation within 
a relatively short term arises, which was 
extended only to 30 June 2013 by the fi-
nancial institution pursuant to the stabil-
ity act,
•	problems of a structural nature which rep-
resent extra burdens for local governments 
(high unemployment, number of socially 
handicapped individuals constantly ris-
ing),
•	in order to increase employment and local 
revenues, local governments plan to im-
plement economic development projects 
which require considerable own resources,
•	local governments were able to use only 
some part of the development credit lines 
by 31 December 2012, which were allo-
cated for large ongoing development pro-
jects.
The objections raised during consultations 
justify the need for improving the monitoring 
activity of the central administration and the 
audit work of the State Audit Office of Hun-
gary to ensure economic discipline and ration-
ality. This means that it is expedient to put au-
dit pressure on local governments, one the one 
hand, to avoid giving rise to less-than-careful 
asset management, and on the other hand, 
that town local governments, which have 
been relieved of a large number of obligations 
and public functions (see Széll Kálmán Plan 
2.0), play a more important role in local food 
supply, while the county local governments, 
which also have significantly less functions 
(compared to the previous period) take a big-
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ger share in regional economic development. 
With the changing role of local governments – 
the maintenance of institutions was replaced by 
the promotion of economic development –, new 
local government functions could be based on 
the technical infrastructure base, realised with 
the help of foreign currency loans.
For practical reasons, local governments 
concluded the debt consolidation agreements 
with the state in nominal value rather than on 
a percentage basis. This is how the Ministry 
of the Interior responsible for consolidation 
wanted to prevent any “hairsplitting bargain-
ing” and over-scrupulous debates that lack 
any professional basis. So, the trilateral agree-
ments were concluded by 28 July 2013 and 
the contracting parties had to conclude finan-
cial settlement by the end of 2013.
The state assumed HUF 612 billion in 
debts from 1956 local governments during 
the consolidation process which took place 
over the summer of 2013, which created very 
favourable conditions for bank portfolios. If 
the government had not acted, banks would 
have suffered significant losses. The assistance 
provided by the state resulted in the improve-
ment of bank portfolios and better earnings, 
whose related public dues were resolved.22
The last stage of the consolidation of local 
governments took place in the spring of 2014. 
The state assumed the remaining debts of 
the local governments with populations over 
5 thousand as well. This stage involved the 
consolidation of debts due on the outstand-
ing transactions of all local governments and 
their associations to financial institutions as at 
31 December 2013. In accordance with appli-
cable regulations, these transactions may have 
involved a credit, loan or security constituting 
a credit relationship (bond), financial lease, 
deferred payment at least for a period of 365 
days and instalment payment. HUF 64 bil-
lion in uncapped appropriation was allocated 
in the 2014 central budget for state grants re-
lated to the debt consolidation of town local 
governments. HUF 4 billion of this amount 
was planned to cover the consolidation of lo-
cal governments which would conclude their 
debt settlement procedure in 2014. The actual 
amount paid out was HUF 67.4 billion. The 
payment was recorded as expenditure in the 
budget and as revenue in the subsystem of lo-
cal governments, so its effect on the balance of 
public finances – and government debt – was 
neutral. The last round of debt consolidation 
concluded on 28 February cost HUF 456 bil-
lion, HUF 30–40 billion more than estimat-
ed, eventually amounting to a total of HUF 
1344.4 billion.
new diMenSionS in THe oPerATion of 
locAl governMenTS
Currently, the autonomy of local governments 
is affected by several restrictions – in order to 
maintain their financial stability. For example, 
the act on national property restricts the rights 
of local governments regarding the founda-
tion of economic associations and the acqui-
sition of stakes in economic associations. At 
the same time it is a fact, as it has been men-
tioned before, that the State Audit Office of 
Hungary’s mandate only covers the auditing 
of business associations owned by local gov-
ernments since 2011, which had unforesee-
able consequences in the past few decades (see 
the Budapest Transport Company). Therefore, 
the restrictions set out in the act on national 
property serve transparency and efficiency, 
since it takes time for the government and the 
audit authority to acquire appropriate infor-
mation on all the companies owned by local 
governments.
A local government can only have a stake in 
an economic organisation if its liability does 
not exceed its financial contribution (for ex-
ample, a limited liability company or a joint-
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stock company). The business activities of 
local governments should not jeopardise the 
performance of their mandatory functions. 
As of 1 January 2012, several restrictions ap-
ply to the transactions of local governments 
that create debt (such as taking out loans, is-
suing securities). These rules are contained in 
the Stability Act. Local governments may carry 
out transactions creating a debt only with the 
prior approval of the government (in special 
cases). They can take out only liquid loans for 
operating purposes, which means they cannot 
finance the deficit planned in their operational 
expenditures from external sources (loans), but 
only from internal sources (such as residues 
generated in the previous years). As of 2013, 
pursuant to the new statutory provisions, no 
operating deficit can be planned at all.
While local governments are part of the sys-
tem which executes public functions regulated 
by statutory provisions, they have relative eco-
nomic autonomy in terms of how these func-
tions are performed and in several other areas. 
Act XV of 1997 on the Declaration of the Eu-
ropean Charter of Local Self-Government sets 
out the following on the scope of authority of 
local governments (Article 4): “Public respon-
sibilities shall generally be exercised, in prefer-
ence, by those authorities which are closest to the 
citizen. Allocation of responsibility to another 
authority should weigh up the extent and nature 
of the task and requirements of efficiency and 
economy.” So, the Charter suggests that where 
a public function cannot be ensured on site, 
it should be carried out by the administrative 
authority that is closest to the citizens. This 
means that the foundation of joint local gov-
ernment offices (the new Local Government 
Act, Act CLXXXIX of 2011) is in accord with 
the European principles of local governments.
In accordance with the Local Government 
Act, as of 2013, towns within a borough with 
less than 2000 inhabitants must set up a joint 
local government office. The total population 
of settlements belonging to the joint office 
thus created should be at least 2000 or the 
number of villages should be at least seven. 
Settlements with over 2000 inhabitants may 
also belong to the joint local government of-
fice set up by virtue of law. This measure can 
help generate considerable savings in costs 
and improve the level of services.
The county institutions and the healthcare 
institutions run by the Municipality of Bu-
dapest were transferred to the state’s mainte-
nance as of 1 January 2012, followed by the 
hospitals maintained by town local govern-
ments as of 1 May 2012.
As a result of the measures introduced on 
the authorisation of loans pursuant to Act 
CXCIV of 2011 on the Economic Stability of 
Hungary, the deficit of the local government 
subsystem decreased significantly. In accord-
ance with Article 34(5) of the Fundamental 
Law, which entered into force in 2012, a sepa-
rate law may make the commitments of local 
governments subject to certain conditions or 
to the approval of the government in order 
to maintain budgetary equilibrium. On the 
basis of this authorisation, the Stability Act 
provided that the payment obligations of local 
governments resulting from transactions that 
create a debt in the current year may not ex-
ceed 50 per cent of their own revenues in any 
year until expiry. This regulation was meant 
to ensure that the local governments do not 
become insolvent due to their debt service 
obligations. Concurrently with this, the ban 
on taking out additional loans by local gov-
ernments that have already exceeded this limit 
created an opportunity for reducing exposure 
to debt. In addition, any transaction with a 
development or operational purpose that cre-
ates debt for a local government was made 
subject to the approval of the government.
Certain credit transactions were possible 
without the approval of the government. The 
loans taken out for advancing EU develop-
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ment grants, that is, for providing the own 
contribution in these tenders were removed 
from the loans requiring approval, since these 
loans were connected to investments sup-
ported by EU funds and the coverage of loans 
was the development grant provided by the 
European Union. Loans taken out for opera-
tional purposes with durations of less than a 
year are also not subject to approval, as they 
do not have an effect on the year-end status 
of government debt. On the other hand, their 
authorisation would cause too much delay, 
weakening the liquidity of local governments.
The transactions related to restructuring 
loans taken out for the conclusion of creditor 
agreements during the debt settlement proce-
dure may also be carried out without the ap-
proval of the government. In addition, trans-
actions below HUF 10 million, HUF 100 
million in the case of the capital and towns 
with county rank, which create a debt are also 
not subject to government approval.
The procedure for the contribution to the 
commitments of local governments is regu-
lated by Government Decree No. 353/2011 
(XII. 30.) on the detailed rules on the con-
tribution to transactions creating a debt. This 
regulation also defines what own revenues can 
be used as a collateral for the transactions cre-
ating a debt.
SoMe THeoreTicAl ASPecTS And THe 
evAluATion of debT conSolidATion
The financial instability created by previous 
governments inevitably pushed the current 
government into a stabilising and restructur-
ing role. The debts of county local govern-
ments were assumed by the state in 2011, fol-
lowed by the decision on the comprehensive 
settlement of the debt portfolios of town local 
governments in 2012 and 2013. The mainte-
nance of institutions performing public func-
tions in towns and villages (schools, certain 
specialised social institutions, hospitals and 
outpatient healthcare institutions) were also 
transferred to the state’s scope of authority or 
liability.
The bailout of town local governments is 
quite common in the international arena as 
well.23 The enforcement of soft budget limits24 
is, therefore, a widespread global phenom-
enon.25 In these cases, the soft budget limit 
means that on the basis of past experience, 
local governments (and the banks financing 
them) trust that the state will save them any-
way. Those who believe that the soft budget 
limit, that is, state consolidation, is wrong26 
argue that the government should not bail 
out economic entities that are loss-making 
– whether they are market players or entities 
belonging to public finances – because it will 
not force them to observe the rules of respon-
sible financial management. However, as far 
as the indebtedness of the Hungarian local 
government sector is concerned, it is impor-
tant to stress that neither the centrally planned 
system, nor the neoliberal macro-economic 
policy enabled local governments and market 
players to take a course that ensures sustain-
able development and modernise their infra-
structure. The new government in 2010 had 
to face non-viable local governments, which 
was the result of the bad macro-economic pol-
icy pursued in the past few decades. In most 
cases, state authorities meant to supervise and 
regulate the activities of local governments 
rather than the local governments themselves 
should be held responsible for the financial 
problems that have emerged. The lack of ef-
fective state regulation and supervision, the 
poor fiscal policy that was forced to introduce 
decentralisation as well as the basic neoliberal 
philosophy which gave too much freedom to 
local governments, but at the same time used 
strong restrictions on resources, along with 
irresponsible budgetary practice, should be 
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held responsible for these problems in the first 
place. However, leaving local governments to 
their fate would have resulted in even more se-
rious problems in the national economy, lead-
ing to the failure of the performance of local 
public services, socio-economic conflicts and 
ultimately – if they escalate – total financial 
collapse of public finances. Therefore, the bail-
out using taxpayer money entails lower social 
costs than letting the local government system 
“sink” and leaving it in a non-viable state. Put-
ting the operation of local governments on a 
sustainable course, after they have been freed 
from their debts and their range of functions 
reduced, and keeping them on this course is 
the responsibility of a government that pursues 
an economic policy which supports active su-
pervisory and regulatory functions.
1 The legislator reduced the personal income tax rate from 
36 to 16 per cent. According to the new rules, the pref-
erential 10 per cent corporate tax rate was raised from a 
tax base of HUF 50 million to HUF 500 million, with 
the provision that in the future the use of the preferential 
rate will not be subject to any specific conditions.
2 In addition to family tax reliefs, public utility charg-
es for households were reduced through official 
price regulation.
3 The controls for the utilisation of public funds fo-
cused on performance audits and the supervision of 
the solvency of public finances at the subsystem lev-
el. The audit mandate of the SAO was extended to 
economic enterprises owned by local governments. 
The circumstances of the USD 25 billion stand-by 
credit line of the IMF–WB–ECB consortium (debt 
of the central subsystem of public finances, 2012).
4 For more details see: Lentner, 2013. Chapter XII
5 The law enacted in 1998 offered “tempting” tax re-
lief and promising returns to young people, career 
starters and those with a higher income to join pri-
vate pension funds, even making it mandatory for 
some age groups. The contributions paid by them to 
private pension funds created an increasingly larger 
gap in the state pension budget, making it difficult 
to cover the payment of pension for the already re-
tired age groups. The state lost revenues and its fi-
nancial instability was growing constantly.
6 Permanent retail foreign currency loan bailout pack-
ages beginning in 2011 and the reinforcement of fi-
nancial consumer protection represent consolidation 
by the state.
7 According to the basic principle of the Washing-
ton consensus, the state is a bad owner, so it calls 
for the privatisation of state assets. It advocates the 
free, unhindered flow of goods, services, capital and 
workforce. It proposes to minimise state control and 
supervision.
8 The demand of households for government securi-
ties can be increased by enhancing the discretionary 
income of households, which is ensured by the gov-
ernment through fiscal and official price regulation 
measures.
9 The year of full-scale fiscal consolidation.
10 In the second quarter of 2014 (annual data, year 
on year), GDP-growth is as high as 3.9 per cent, 
the highest in Europe, while the economic perfor-
mance of the euro area hardly reaches 0.7 per cent. 
The intervals of Hungarian growth: Q2 2013, 0.3; 
Q3 2013, 1.9; Q4 2013, 2.7; and Q1 2014, 3.5 per 
cent.
11 Act LXV on Local Governments
12  Lentner, Cs., 2005. Chapters 6–8 detail the finan-
cial management of local governments
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13 Audits conducted at 62 town local governments 
(Audit on the financial situation and financial man-
agement system of local governments in 2011, SAO 
report, April 2012)
14 The local government subsystem took on a sort of 
black box nature. The cash flow deficit (without 
credit and security transactions in a GFS system) was 
HUF 42 billion higher in 2010 than the underesti-
mated plan in the annual budget. This also contrib-
uted to the exceeding of the calculated public finance 
deficit of 3.8 per cent. See: Summary evaluation, 
2011. Following the consolidation, the local govern-
ment public finance subsystem recorded a surplus.
15 SAO Chairman László Domokos spoke about the debt 
issue of local governments and the audits performed by 
the audit institution that shed light on the matter in his 
lecture, delivered to the students of the National Univer-
sity of Public Service on 3 December 2012.
16 Instead of a comprehensive crisis management con-
cept, the investments implemented at the town 
level helped resolve the tension and the bottlenecks 
stemming from the operation of the central govern-
ment, especially as far as their carryover effects in the 
2008–2010 period are concerned.
17 At the beginning of 2013, there was only talk of par-
tial assumption.
18 The findings of the State Audit Office of Hungary 
and its chairman were supported by specific local 
government audit reports equipped with a new audit 
methodology (e.g. The Financial Matters of Local 
Governments, April 2012) as well as academic pub-
lications. Domokos, 2010; Domokos, 2011; Pulay, 
2011; Domokos, 2012; Gyüre L.-né, 2012).
19 Its legal basis was the tender opportunity set out in 
Point 10 a) of Annex 3 of Act CCXXX of 2013 on 
the Central Budget of 2014. Ministry of the Interior 
Regulation No. 10/2014 (II.19) provided for the 
detailed rules of tenders. The 2014 HUF 10 billion 
budget fund was increased by HUF 2.1 billion by 
the Ministry of the Interior.
20 János Kornai (2014, pp. 74–75) does outlines “loss-
es”, but in my view, most of the local governments 
that did not take advantage of the loan opportunity 
were less “economising”, but for the most part rather 
uncreditworthy, lacking a development concept nec-
essary for the loan.
21 Audit on the financial situation of local govern-
ments... April 2012
22 The second “Varga package” announced at the end 
of June 2013 proposed a 7 per cent tax rate after 
the assumed debts, but the government eventually 
renounced it. Instead, the banks had to pay a lump-
sum amount. The amount to be paid was 208 per 
cent of the transaction duty payable for the period of 
January – April 2013. The increased transaction duty 
payable by the banks represented a one-off revenue 
of nearly HUF 75 billion for the budget in 2013 
(see the 2013 final accounts for its actual realisation). 
With the 7 per cent tax rate, the banks would have 
paid HUF 40–50 billion to the budget. In my view, 
with its final decision (involving an “indirect legal ti-
tle”) the government wanted to ensure that another 
bailout of the banks (after the retail foreign currency 
debtors) would have a long-term favourable effect 
on the earnings of the banks which should be settled 
proportionately in terms of public dues.
23  Fink-Stratmann, 2011., Josselin – Padovano – 
Rocaboy, 2012., Dietrichson – Ellegárd, 2013., and 
as a new development, the unmanageable amount of 
debts run up by the shadow banking system at local 
governments and their business associations in China 
and their likely central settlement (Risky Business 
Global Threat, FT, 2014). Furthermore, the indebted-
ness of local governments, SAO international confer-
ence, 17 April 2012 (Spanish and Swiss experiences).
24 The name is based on János Kornai (Kornai, 2011 a, 
b; Kornai, 2012;, Kornai, 2014)
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